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Changing Interactions between Corporatist and Parliamentary
Arenas in Social Policy: Reform Processes in the Field of Swiss
Pension Policy and Unemployment Insurance in the 90s
Abstract
Pre-parliamentary negotiations between the corporatist actors are of central importance in Swiss social
policy making, since it is generally in this arena that the main elements of the reform are decided.
However, corporatist negotiations have become increasingly difficult during the last decade, because of
Welfare retrenchment pressure, ideological polarisation, increasing media coverage and declining
legitimacy of peak associations. We expect, thus, that it has become harder to reach compromises in the
pre-parliamentary phase. Nevertheless, the threat of the failure of policy reforms in an optional
referendum at the end of the decision-making process still fosters a pressure for compromise-seeking.
Compromises between the social partners might therefore be replaced by inter-party agreements
negotiated in the parliamentary phase. In our paper, we test the hypothesis that the role of the
parliamentary phase in social policy making has increased in the 1990s compared to the 1970s by
comparing unemployment insurance and pension policy reforms in both periods. We find, indeed, that
corporatist compromise-seeking has become more difficult and that a shift from pre-parliamentary
bargaining to inter-party negotiation in Parliament has taken place. However, the logic of
compromise-finding was quite different in the two cases. Whereas in the case of the unemployment
insurance reform, the social partners were recalled by the MPs for a new round of negotiation which
finally led to the consensual adoption of an innovative solution, in the pension reform, the final solution
was elaborated by the representatives of the parties alone and consisted rather in a strategically tied up
package of extensive and restrictive elements than to a consensual agreement.
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Pre-parliamentary negotiations between the corporatist actors are of central importance in Swiss 
social policy making, since it is generally in this arena that the main elements of the reform are 
decided. However, corporatist negotiations have become increasingly difficult during the last 
decade, because of Welfare retrenchment pressure, ideological polarisation, increasing media 
coverage and declining legitimacy of peak associations. We expect, thus, that it has become 
harder to reach compromises in the pre-parliamentary phase. Nevertheless, the threat of the 
failure of policy reforms in an optional referendum at the end of the decision-making process still 
fosters a pressure for compromise-seeking. Compromises between the social partners might 
therefore be replaced by inter-party agreements negotiated in the parliamentary phase.  
In our paper, we test the hypothesis that the role of the parliamentary phase in social policy 
making has increased in the 1990s compared to the 1970s by comparing unemployment insurance 
and pension policy reforms in both periods. We find, indeed, that corporatist compromise-seeking 
has become more difficult and that a shift from pre-parliamentary bargaining to inter-party 
negotiation in Parliament has taken place. However, the logic of compromise-finding was quite 
different in the two cases. Whereas in the case of the unemployment insurance reform, the social 
partners were recalled by the MPs for a new round of negotiation which finally led to the 
consensual adoption of an innovative solution, in the pension reform, the final solution was 
elaborated by the representatives of the parties alone and consisted rather in a strategically tied up 
package of extensive and restrictive elements than to a consensual agreement.  
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In the literature on Swiss decision-making processes, the primordial importance of pre-
parliamentary concertation for the substantive policy outputs has been frequently pointed out (see 
for instance Kriesi 1980, Poitry 1989, Linder 1987). This finding seems to hold true particularly 
in the field of social policy, which is highly dominated by the peak associations of trade unions 
and business associations, the so-called "social partners". The compromises they had agreed upon 
in the pre-parliamentary arena have usually been decisive for the reforms, leaving little room 
thereafter for interparty negotiation and amendments in Parliament. However, these findings 
mainly relate to the 1970s, a time of expansionary social policy reforms. Since then, in particular 
in the 1990s, the conditions under which the corporatist negotiations take place seem to have 
changed in several respects. In the context of economic recession, increasing State budget deficits 
and socio-demographic pressure, claims for Welfare State retrenchment are raised. Therefore, 
corporatist bargaining for the shares of a cake that tends to become smaller is getting more and 
more difficult, leading to polarisation of discourse and positions. Furthermore, the previously 
closed sphere of confidential negotiation is increasingly "opened up" by the media (a factor to 
which studies on the decline of the legitimacy of neo-corporatist solutions arranged behind closed 
doors have not devoted much attention). Peak associations are, hence, observed more critically 
and their authority and legitimacy are not considered as God-given any longer. These factors let 
us expect that it has become harder to find settled compromises in the pre-parliamentary phase 
which then rather easily pass the Parliament. Thus, our general hypothesis is that the role of 
Parliament in social policy making has increased in the 1990s compared to the 1970s. 
Considering the persisting threat of a complete failure of reforms in an optional popular 
referendum, a major Swiss peculiarity, we still expect the mechanisms of compromise-seeking to 
prevail. However, compromises between the corporatist peak associations might be "replaced" by 
compromises negotiated between the main political parties in Parliament.  
Two cases of social policy reforms in the areas of pension policy and unemployment insurance 
policy are analysed1. Both of them have been subject to major reforms in the 1970s as well as in 
the 1990s and, thus, allow a longitudinal comparison of the interactions of the different 
                                                
1 The two case studies are part of the ongoing research project «Reshaping decision making processes under external 
pressure", which is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant number: 5004-058511/1) in the context 
of its Priority Programme «Switzerland Towards the Future» and is directed by Prof. Yannis Papadopoulos. By 
means of 8 case studies of reform processes, we scrutinise the effect of international legislation on Swiss decision-
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negotiation arenas. They are, furthermore, exemplary cases of social policy fields with an 
encompassing pre-parliamentary phase experiencing standing expert committees that bring 
together the dominant peak associations of trade unions and business associations.  
 
In a first part of the paper, we shall provide a brief overview of the particularities of Swiss 
decision-making processes and of the available knowledge on the relative importance of the 
several negotiation arenas. The 8th reform of the old age pension system and the introduction of a 
constitutional article on the mandatory character of unemployment insurance will illustrate the 
"traditional" mode of Swiss patterns of decision-making in social policy issues. 
In a second step, the main theoretical arguments sustaining our hypothesis on increasing 
difficulties of corporatist negotiations and a changing role of Parliament are discussed, before the 
study of the 10th reform of the pension system and the reform of the unemployment insurance will 
allow to assess them empirically. In a conclusive chapter, similarities and differences between the 
two cases will be highlighted on the basis of longitudinal as well as cross-sectoral comparison. 
The major findings of the case studies are discussed with reference to recent studies on changes 
in the relative importance of the parliamentary arena.   
1. Social policy decision-making in the 1970s: predominance of corporatist 
agreements 
Swiss decision-making processes are generally known as slow, inclusive and consensual. 
Armingeon (1998) distinguishes three interconnected fora of negotiation in economic and social 
policy making: the corporatist forum, the consociational forum and the cantonal-federal forum. 
All of them are typical of "consensual" polities characterised by neo-corporatist arrangements, 
horizontal power fragmentation in the party system and vertical power fragmentation at the 
territorial level (Lijphart 1999).  
The main actors of the corporatist forum are interest organisations. Their negotiations mostly take 
place at the beginning of the decision-making process in a high number of specialised extra-
parliamentary federal committees2. These committees include a mixture of interest 
                                                                                                                                                        
making. The two cases of social policy reform presented in this paper are control cases, which means that an 
international political influence can be considered as absent. 
2 In 1978, 373 "expert" committees existed (in spite of their label, such bodies are mainly composed in a way as to 
ensure proportional representation of the main interests). 30% of them created by the Department of domestic affairs 
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representatives, experts, bureaucrats and politicians. High civil servants often chair the 
committees and usually play a mediating role between the main interest organisations. Laws are 
frequently drafted in such bodies which means that the bills usually benefit at a very early stage 
of a large support of the involved actors. Expert committees are one of the most important points 
of access for organised interests (Kriesi 1980: 589), but the latter still can make their voice heard 
in the following consultation procedure, in which the initial draft is again formally submitted to 
them, together with political parties and to cantonal governments. The "social partners", as trade 
unions and employers' organisations are called in Switzerland, can also be invited later on to 
hearings in parliamentary committees, and of course they can influence referendum campaigns: 
they have thus multiple venues that allow them to exercise an impact on political decisions. 
Interparty negotiation takes place in the consociational forum. Armingeon mentions in this 
category primarily the broad Swiss multi-party government that includes - in a stable composition 
since 1959 - representatives of the main four political parties. It acts as a collegial government 
and has to approve the bills, frequently drafted by expert committees and refined by the 
administration after the consultation procedure, before they are handed over to the parliament. 
However, since the members of government take their decisions autonomously - in the sense that 
neither are the ministers held to follow their party's position nor do parties or parliamentary 
caucuses have to respect the decisions of their ministers – government approval of a bill cannot 
completely replace interparty concertation in Parliament. The parliamentary committees of the 
two chambers are the main place where such negotiations take place. These specialised 
committees exist on a permanent basis since 1991 and their composition reflect proportionally the 
main political parties. The plenum of each Chamber of the bicameral parliament usually follows 
the suggestions of its committees.  
Finally, the cantonal-federal forum provides the cantons with the opportunity of access to several 
stages of the decision-making process. Representatives of cantonal governments may be 
members of experts committees, they can be heard in parliamentary committees and – of course – 
participate in the consultation procedures. Moreover, Swiss bicameralism also gives to cantons a 
say in the decision-making process: each of them – whatever the size of its population – delegates 
two Councellors of States to the second federal chamber (whether these delegates – who, unlike 
                                                                                                                                                        
(that deals with social policy) and another third by the Department of economic affairs (that deals with labour market 
policy) (Germann, 1985:5). Armingeon mentions the existence of between 200 and 400 committees in 1998.  
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the German Bundesrat, are not members of cantonal governments, but are elected by their 
constituencies – represent cantonal and not other interests is however disputed).  
 
As to the relative importance of the different fora, our knowledge is still mainly based on the 
studies of Kriesi (1980), Poitry (1989) as well as Riklin and Zehnder (quoted in Linder 1987), all 
of them referring to the 1970s. Poitry has shown that the pre-parliamentary phase – 
corresponding largely to the corporatist forum - takes about 70% of the time of the whole 
process. In the 1970s, this first phase of the process was not only the longest, but also the most 
important substantially. According to the findings of Riklin and Zehnder, only about one third of 
357 bills have been modified in Parliament between 1971 and 1975, and not more than 6,4% of 
them have been modified substantially. In general, the earlier a point of intervention is situated in 
the process, the more it is considered as important (Kriesi 1980). Thus, the early corporatist 
negotiations taking place in the expert committees seem to result usually into an agreement 
which, if at all, is only marginally amended in Parliament3. As Kriesi puts it: "Ganz allgemein 
kann man sagen, dass dem Parlament, und damit dem Parteiensystem, dessen Fokus im Staat das 
Parlament darstellt, bestenfalls die Funktion eines Korrektivs zukommt" (1980: 589)4. As it will 
be shown below, this finding is perfectly confirmed in the case of social policy making (pension 
system and unemployment insurance) in the 70s: the "corporatist" forum was much more 
important than the "consociational" (partisan) forum.  
 
In order to understand the crucial importance of early compromise-oriented negotiation in Swiss 
decision-making, the more recent literature on veto points is most helpful. Immergut defines veto 
points as "points of strategic uncertainty where decisions may be overturned" (1992: 27-8). In a 
                                                
3 Additionally, Parri (1987: 77) notes that the government – as a consociational actor – "almost invariably makes 
only marginal corrections to the legislative proposals" before sending it to Parliament.  
4 Sciarini (1999: 608-10) does not agree with the hypothesis of an appeasing and decisive effect of the pre-
parliamentary consultation in the 1970s. For 1971-75, he shows that the "degree of conflictuality in Parliament" is 
correlated with the existence of an expert committee or a consultation procedure, as well as with the legal status of 
the bill (law or constitutional article) and with the "importance" of the issue. However, the "conflictuality" is 
measured by the number of interventions of MPs, the existence or absence of any difference between the Chambers 
and the existence or absence of any modification of the bill in Parliament. These indicators, however, do not allow us 
to evaluate the importance of the modifications, i.e. whether such amendments really questioned a previously 
reached agreement. The same is true for the high number of interventions in the plenary session. Since we know that 
debates in plenum have an important symbolic value, the high number of interventions does not necessarily point to 
major amendments of the reform.   
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more actor-centred perspective, they can be seen as the opportunities of access to the decision 
making process that veto players - i.e. "individual or collective actors whose agreement is 
required for a policy decision" (Tsebelis 1995: 293) - have in a particular political system. 
Crepaz and Birchfield (2000; see also Crepaz 2001) have refined the concept by distinguishing 
"collective" and "competitive" veto points on the basis of the mode in which the veto players 
intervene. Collective veto points refer to negotiations among the political actors on a face-to-face 
basis. These negotiations are goal-oriented and foster the joint responsibility of the participants 
for a drafted bill. In Switzerland, typical examples of this kind of veto points can be found rather 
at the beginning of the decision-making process, namely the expert committees and interparty 
negotiation in the coalition government as well as in parliamentary committees. Whereas the 
collective veto points refer to direct interaction among the political actors, competitive veto 
points operate through the interplay between separate institutions with mutual veto powers. 
Bicameralism and federalism can be mentioned as typical examples. The Swiss two-chamber-
system and – of course – the optional popular referendum on legislation voted by parliament 
function exactly in the way of competitive veto points. Federalism must also be considered as a 
competitive veto point, since the cantons can exert indirect influence through the higher chamber 
and exert an important influence on the implementation of federal legislation. As a last, less 
typical competitive veto point, the consultation procedure must be mentioned. In a rather initial 
phase of the policy process, it gives to a very wide range of interested actors the possibility to 
express their position on a drafted bill, just after the negotiations in expert committees (when the 
latter are set up). Since the major interest organisations – at least in the case of important reform 
processes – have already had the possibility to intervene previously in such an expert committee, 
their position is quite well-known. In that sense, the consultation procedure can be seen as an 
early "emergency brake", allowing the authorities to detect unexpected, massive opposition, in 
which cases they may even start a second round of negotiations associating the previously 
neglected actors. According to the logic of the famous "Neidhart-hypothesis" (1970), one could 
argue that the high number of competitive veto points towards the end of the Swiss decision-
making process exerts a certain pressure for formal and informal negotiation and concertation 
among the veto players, resulting thus into the growth of collective veto points rather at the 
beginning of the process. The low rate of significant modifications of bills in the parliamentary 
committees in the 1970s might thus be explained by the fact that broad agreements had already 
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been reached by the main interest organisations in the pre-parliamentary phase as well as by the 
strong links that exist between these interest organisations and the political parties5 (Armingeon 
1997: 169). 
1.1. The 8th reform of the old age pension system 19726 
The main goal of the reform was to rise basic pensions significantly to a level allowing the 
beneficiaries to live decently. It went back to three popular initiatives on the future of the old age 
pension system, a high number of parliamentary initiatives and policy proposals from interest 
organisations, all of them sharing the claim for higher basic pensions. The Federal expert 
committee (Commission fédérale de l'AVS) started its negotiations in 1970. This standing 
committee includes about 50 members representing the main economic organisations, insurance 
companies, the cantons and women's organisations. It works closely together with the Federal 
Office for Social Security (Office fédéral des assurances sociales) and depends largely on its 
support for the relevant information (Kriesi 1980: 199). The Committee drafted the bill between 
May 1970 and July 1971, mainly in a specialised sub-committee of 18 members which regularly 
submitted its proposals to the plenum. An agreement was quite rapidly reached between the 
defenders of an 80% rise and those fighting for the doubling of the existing pensions (Binswanger 
1987: 225). The final bill included an immediate 80% rise lasting until 1975, and another 25% 
rise from that year on. Contributions from employers and workers passed from 5,2% to 7,8% and 
even to 8,4% from 1975 on. The bill was unanimously approved by the members of the 
committee. The administration handed the draft over to the Government with very minor 
amendments concerning particularly some financial details that had been criticised in an informal 
consultation of the Conference of cantonal finance ministers (a body for intercantonal 
coordination). When the bill finally was debated in Parliament, the main decisions had already 
been taken and thus, it was approved rapidly after a single debate in the lower chamber, the 
National Council, in March 1972 and another debate in the Council of States in June 1972. The 
                                                
5 Parri (1987: 79) mentions that parties are represented in the parliamentary committees by their most influential and 
skilful deputies ("Parlamentsoligarchie"), who often represent an interest organisation as well. "This combination of 
roles permits associational influence over parliamentary works, but it does not permit party influence over pre-
parliamentary work.". In addition, since 1996 members of Parliament are not allowed anymore to participate in pre-
parliamentary expert committees. This may be seen as an institutional device permitting to disentangle increasingly 
the two spheres.  
6 The presentation of this case study is based on Kriesi (1980) and Binswanger (1987). 
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rapid pace of the parliamentary debates was also due to the fact that the right-wing parties wanted 
to take the decision in favour of higher basic pensions before the date of the popular vote on a 
communist popular initiative in December 1972, in order to weaken the popular support for this 
quite radical text (Kriesi 1980: 201, see also Bonoli 2001). The 8th reform of the basic pension 
scheme was finally approved on the 30th of June 1972 unanimously in both chambers.    
1.2. The constitutional article on unemployment insurance 19767 
The first federal law on unemployment insurance came into effect as late as in 1951 giving the 
federal government only very limited decisional power in the field. The limitations were both 
"corporatist" and "federalist", i.e. the competence for creating a mandatory insurance was still 
attributed to the cantons and the implementation or management of the insurance was largely 
provided by trade unions and business organisations. In the late 1960s, three parliamentary 
initiatives pointed out the weaknesses of that system8 and claimed for a more encompassing 
insurance. Therefore, the federal Office in charge (Office fédéral de l'industrie, des arts et métiers 
et du travail OFIAMT) – mandated by the Government – set up autonomously a draft of a 
constitutional article introducing a mandatory and centralised federal unemployment insurance 
between 1969 and 1972. No experts committee was created, but the advice of a permanent 
commission including mainly "technical experts" of the cantonal level (Commission consultative) 
was asked for advice on several occasions. However, it was only in the regular consultation 
procedure that the cantons and the economic interest organisations could intervene. While the 
cantons largely approved the policy proposal, the peak interest organisations vehemently opposed 
it. The trade unions, although in favour of a mandatory insurance, wanted to keep its management 
in their hands, whereas the employers' organisations, who also supported a decentralised 
management of the insurance, were against its mandatory character. Facing such a lack of support 
from the main corporatist actors, the Government decided not to pursue the reform immediately. 
It was put in a drawer for about a year until 1973, when the first signs of the economic recession 
brought the issue of unemployment insurance back on the political agenda.  
This time, the pre-parliamentary process was far more encompassing. An ad hoc expert 
committee of 31 members was created in January 1974, including representatives of the main 
                                                
7 The presentation of this case study is based on Kriesi (1980) and Bonnébault, Colotti et De Lucia (1995). 
8 In 1974, only 20% of the employees were insured against unemployment (Gilliand 1988). 
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employers organisations, trade unionists, members of cantonal governments as well as 
professionals of the existing insurances, university professors and some others. The committee 
issued in December 1974 a report on the future of the unemployment insurance policy, opting 
mainly for the creation of a federal, mandatory insurance and its financing through equal 
contributions of employers and employees. As to the role of the interest organisations in the 
implementation of the law, a compromise was found: the contributions should be perceived by 
the central government, using the already existing administrative infrastructure of the old age 
pension system. The decentralised insurances, however, mainly administered by the trade unions, 
should provide the payment of the compensations and the maintenance of regular contacts with 
the unemployed. Additionally, the participation of the cantons and the economic organisations in 
the elaboration and the implementation of any new legislation in the field was to be explicitly 
stated in the constitutional article. The Government approved the report in winter 1975 and 
followed the committee's majority when deciding on questions that had been left open9. The 
OFIAMT immediately drafted a constitutional article on the basis of the report which was 
submitted to the consultation procedure in April and May 1975, where it received wide support 
from about 50 participating interest organisations, cantons and political parties; a support which 
was boosted by the continuously worsening economic situation as well as by a written agreement 
of the important business organisations and trade unions, published on the 29th of April 1975, in 
which they, firstly, laid down rules of behaviour in case of the closing down of firms and massive 
dismissals of employees and, secondly, confirmed their support to the new orientation of the 
unemployment insurance policy and their wish for rapid decision-making on that very issue. This 
typical neo-corporatist arrangement referred explicitly to the new constitutional article, which, at 
that time, had not yet been debated in Parliament. The agreement made it almost impossible for 
the political parties to amend the compromise between the social partners on the future of the 
unemployment insurance, because this would have questioned the whole "crisis management" of 
the recession by the main economic interest organisations (Bonnébault et al. 1995: 21) .  
No wonder that the Parliament ratified the constitutional article in very short delays. While the 
pre-parliamentary preparations had taken more than one year and a half, both chambers and their 
committees finished their debates on the issue after only about 7 months in April 1976 and 
                                                
9 Unfortunately, Kriesi (1980) provides no information on how narrow or large these majorities have been in the case 
of certain issues on which the committee had not been able to reach a consensus. 
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approved the article unanimously10. There was a large agreement not only on the article itself, but 
also on the whole concept concerning the future of the unemployment insurance policy11 (Kriesi 
1980: 211). In the mandatory popular referendum that followed and took place in June 1976, 68% 
of the voters and all cantons (both majorities were required) except Schwyz approved the new 
orientation of the unemployment policy. 
 
Both cases highlight in an exemplary way the traditional mode of functioning of the Swiss 
decision-making as described above. A very inclusive and time consuming pre-parliamentary 
phase results into a wide agreement among social partners, the cantons and the government, the 
political parties following the main interest organisations and thus approving the agreement in 
Parliament without any major amendments. Kriesi (1980: 607ss) found in his study that this 
pattern of interaction among the different negotiation fora applied best to the important (social) 
reforms ("grosse Reformwerke"), like those concerned in this paper, whereas in processes on 
popular initiatives or on urgently adopted acts (Arrêtés fédéraux urgents), the parliamentary arena 
has played a more important role.  
2. Social policy decision-making in the 1990s: the end of consensus ? 
In both cases of social policy reforms in the 1970s analysed above, a pre-parliamentary 
agreement reached in the corporatist forum has been decisive for the final output of the reform 
process. The cantonal-federal negotiation has also mainly taken place in the pre-parliamentary 
phase with representatives of the cantons being members of the expert committees and with 
cantonal governments expressing their views in the consultation procedure. The consociational 
forum bringing together the political parties, however, played a very minor role in both reform 
processes. The governmental coalition, as well as a very large majority of members of Parliament 
approved the previously drafted agreements without any significant amendments.  
                                                
10 This does not mean that there have been no minority propositions in Parliament at all. In the case of unemployment 
policy, for instance, socialist members of Parliament have tried put anew on the agenda some claims already debated 
but rejected in the pre-parliamentary phase (Bonnébault et al. 1995: 25). Since, however, the approval of these 
propositions would have challenged the whole compromise, they were rejected by large majorities.        
11 Only half a year later, in October 1976, a "transitory law" ("Ordre transitoire") was adopted by the Parliament on 
the basis of the constitutional article, creating the mandatory unemployment insurance. It anticipated the uncontested 
aspects of the new policy – its mandatory character, the contribution rates, the role of the economic associations – 
while leaving several additional aspects – i.e. measures in order to 'prevent' unemployment - to the following regular 
reform of the Unemployment Insurance Law was adopted in 1982.  
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Does this pattern of consensual social policy decision-making in a phase of Welfare State 
expansion also apply to times of Welfare State retrenchment as the 1990s? At first sight, this 
seems not to be the case. In pension policy reform as well as in unemployment insurance reform, 
no compromise between the social partners has been found in the pre-parliamentary phase taking 
place at the beginning of the 1990s. How can we explain this change? 
2.1. Corporatist negotiation under pressure 
Several factors may explain why corporatist compromise-seeking has become increasingly 
difficult. While the literature provides only few theoretical arguments for this development, there 
are several case studies on social policy decision-making in other small corporatist European 
countries - such as Austria or the Netherlands - that shed light on possible reasons for declining 
pre-parliamentary compromise-seeking and –finding. We will discuss the main arguments found 
in this recent literature and their relevance as possible explanatory hypothesis for the obvious 
increasing difficulty of corporatist negotiation in the field of social policy making in Switzerland. 
The assessment of their relevance is based on the literature as well as on elite interviews 
conducted with representatives of the social partners, of the political parties and with high civil 
servants12. The following two case studies will allow to verify empirically which mechanisms 
have been at work.  
 
Welfare state retrenchment: In times of economic recession, budget deficits in State households 
and – additionally – sociodemographic pressures on the pension system, it is of course more 
difficult for the social partners to reach an agreement than in times of Welfare State expansion.  
The main problem in these periods consists in the coincidence of the necessity to spend less 
because of budget deficits on the one hand and an increasing need of social security spending 
because of rising unemployment rates etc. on the other hand. The divergent objectives of trade 
unions and employers associations in such situations make compromises more difficult to reach 
than in a context of growth (Bonoli 1999b). While trade unions want to maintain or even increase 
the level of social security spending and thus to rise taxes or contributions, employers' 
associations plead for cutting welfare expenditures. Therefore, even though the social partners are 
                                                
12 For a table of the quoted interviews, cf appendix. 
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still inclined to negotiate upon policy reform, they are unable to overcome this cleavage and to 
agree on a common project.  
The argument can be maintained as a hypothesis for the Swiss case, since the financial and socio-
demographic situation of the 1990s exerted a pressure for Welfare State retrenchment. Most of 
the interviewees confirmed that compromise-seeking in this context was particularly difficult 
(interviews 1,2,3,5,6,7).  
 
Ideological polarisation: The argument of an increasing ideological polarisation between the 
social partners is developed in the literature on Switzerland (Mach 1999, Bonoli 1999a), where a 
change of attitude in the economic sectors most exposed to international competition (finance, 
export industry) towards social policy could be observed in the 1990. Social and economic well-
being were newly considered as antagonist objectives (Bonoli 1999b). The claim for a less 
consensual attitude of the employers was risen in several "white books" (Leutwiler et al 1991; de 
Pury et al. 1995) presenting programs for a neo-liberal reform of the Swiss economic and social 
policy. These books were published mainly by a group of important economic leaders of the 
export-oriented sectors. They addressed their claims and programs directly to the government and 
the public, because they felt their interests were no longer efficiently and clearly represented by 
the Vorort, the key employers association of the large, export-oriented companies13. In reaction to 
these white books and to internal tensions, Kriesi (2000) observed an effort of the Vorort – 
together with the Society for the promotion of the Swiss economy (SDES) – to provide a clearer 
and more homogeneous message in favour of a liberal market economy in order to counter some 
members' impressions that the associations had become too closely involved in political 
compromise-seeking.  
It remains, however, questionable, whether this ideological polarisation had significant 
implications for the social policy negotiations. While the trade union leaders confirmed in the 
interviews (1,3) the "ideological hardening" of the Vorort in particular and of the right-wing 
forces in general, they also pointed to the fact that the confrontational attitude of the Vorort was 
more pronounced than the attitude and positions of the Union of Employers Associations (UPS) 
                                                
13 The Vorort traditionally represents the economy in matters of economic and fiscal policy, while the Union of 
Employers Associations (UPS) deals with social policy and labour market policy. 
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with whom they stood in direct contact. The leader of the UPS also asserted (5) that at no point in 
the 1990s, his association had the intention to withdraw from corporatist negotiations.  
 
Increasing media coverage: Linked to the polarisation of discourse, the increasing importance of 
media coverage also accentuate the difficulty to reach compromise in corporatist bargaining. 
Corporatism needs a sphere of confidential negotiation. Mutual confidence between the social 
partners is important for on-going bargaining and compromise-seeking. However, the importance 
of the mass media as a strategic resource of political actors and as a political actor on its own has 
increased enormously in the 1990s (Kriesi 2001). Is corporatist compromise-seeking still possible 
with the media eager on diffusing spectacular, secret information and promoting a growing 
personalisation of politics? The tension between the "logic of influence" and bargaining, 
prevalent among the negotiators of corporatist organisations, and the "logic of membership", 
stressing the fidelity to the objectives of the associations, is reinforced by the increasing 
importance of media coverage. This also partially explain the declining legitimacy of peak 
associations (see below).  
Although the interviewed trade union and business associations leaders (1,5), as well a high civil 
servant (7) confirm the spectacular increase of media coverage of the policy process, they also 
insist on the necessary distinction between a rather new and "mediatised" area of sometimes 
polemic confrontation and a still confidential area of negotiation14. One interviewee (5) even adds 
that the personal relations and confidence among the corporatist actors have become increasingly 
important with the increasing media coverage. Consequently, if the actors succeed in separating 
to a certain extent their "forum of negotiation" from their "arena of confrontation", consensual 
compromise-seeking is still possible. We shall check whether this condition was satisfied in the 
cases of pension reform and unemployment insurance reform in the 1990s. 
 
Declining legitimacy of peak associations: Crepaz (1995, 1994) as well as Talos and Kittel 
(1999) – illustrating their arguments with evidence from Austria - argue that the legitimacy of 
                                                
14 This distinction of two spheres of policy making is similar to Leca's (1996: 125) identification of two sorts of 
demands a government has to satisfy: on the one hand, it has to be responsive and accountable to its electorate and 
on the other hand, it is expected to solve problems effectively. Leca expects increasing contradictions between these 
two spheres of government activity, because the short term-pressure emanating from public opinion makes 
sustainable, technocratic problem solving more and more difficult. 
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peak interest associations is increasingly questioned, both from the "outside" as from "within". 
From the outside, political parties (in Austria mainly the (former) opposition parties FPö, 
Liberales Forum and the Greens) criticise the corporatist actors as being undemocratic and only 
little representative. Furthermore, since not being exposed to electoral competition, they are 
accused of losing touch with reality in the sense that they seem unable to integrate new issues as 
environmentalism and gender equality issues (Crepaz 1994). Given these critiques, political 
parties as the main actors of the parliamentary arena took their distance from interest 
organisations and felt legitimised to question corporatist agreements by playing a more active 
role as legislators. As to the "internal" aspects, Crepaz (1995) points out an increasing 
heterogeneity of the interests of members and a weakening of the ability to enforce peak-level 
agreements onto dissenting members.  
In Switzerland, peak associations never reached such a high level of coercive power as in Austria, 
so that probably the erosion of their authority was less significant. However, similarly to the 
Austrian FPö, the Swiss conservative party (UDC), leaded by Christoph Blocher, also openly 
criticised the parties of the governmental coalition, including his own national party, and the 
traditional business associations as being inefficient and useless. Kriesi (2000: 8) notes that the 
business community has indeed been divided on an number of issues submitted to popular 
referenda in the 1990s. Kriesi, however, does not refer to social policy issues, but to economic 
and ecological ones. Concerning social policy, the leader of the Union of Employers Associations 
denies a loss of the Union's authority (5) and attributes problems of this kind rather to the main 
actors in the field of economic and regulatory policy. According to trade union leaders (1,3), the 
hard times of economic recession have even increased their internal homogeneity, because of the 
need to speak with one strong voice in the negotiations. Our two case studies will show whether 
internal conflicts and (increasing) gaps between parties and interest organisations have played a 
role in the shift of the decisive phase from the corporatist to the parliamentary arena.  
 
These are the main arguments that could explain why in both of our case studies, the social 
partners have not been able to reach a compromise in the pre-parliamentary phase. Nevertheless, 
rather than a complete failure of compromise-seeking, we expect rather – on the ground of a 
number of theoretical considerations - a shift of compromise-seeking from the first collective 
veto point – experts committees bringing together corporatist actors – to the second collective 
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veto point – the Parliament with political parties as the main actors. In the following section, we 
shall discuss the arguments supporting the hypothesis that corporatist compromises might be 
replaced by interparty agreements.  
2.2. Strengthening of multi-party agreements in Parliament ? 
The Swiss decision-making process presents a sequence of decisional loci. This characteristic is 
considered to hamper efficient decision-making by raising transaction costs between negotiation 
partners, especially if the most important among them have a blackmailing power due to their 
reputation as veto players. It is, however, often overlooked that a multiplication of collective veto 
points may also increase the chances of reforms being consensually decided.  
Benz (2000: 110ss) has pointed out the virtues of loosely connected negotiation arenas in an 
article on decision-making in multi-level systems. He argues that in political systems with more 
than one state level – which implies compulsory negotiations between the levels as for instance in 
a federalist state or in the European Union -, several conditions might enhance the chances of 
effective, goal-oriented policy-making and diminish the risk of reform deadlock or 
implementation deficits. First of all, the representatives of the two levels must not be given 
imperative instructions but rather "free mandates" (2000: 106) so that they are allowed to bargain 
and to make concessions. Secondly, a functional separation of negotiation arenas is needed. The 
distinctive criterion for this differentiation in Benz' model is the stage of the policy-process, i.e. 
agenda-setting, decision-making and evaluation. These arenas ought to be loosely coupled, which 
means that although there exists a functional link between them, the decisions taken in one arena 
do not imperatively predetermine the decision taken in the following arena.15 Furthermore, the 
two arenas should not follow the same logic: goal-oriented and rather technical negotiations are 
held among experts in the agenda-setting arena, whereas the decisional arena is the locus of 
political bargaining.  
 
                                                
15 In Benz' theory, the negotiations in the agenda-setting arena take place separately on an intra-level basis and are 
held at the same time as the inter-level, decisional negotiations. The example given (2000:113-4) of the EU structural 
policy, however, does not correspond exactly to this model. In this case, the inter-governmental, decisional 
negotiations in the European Parliament follow only after the alternatives have been previously discussed and 
prepared by the committee, its experts and partially by the Parliament itself. Thus, the two arenas are temporally 
separated and, to a certain extent, the preparatory negotiations already bring together both levels.  
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To what extent does Benz' theory apply to the case of Swiss decision-making structures? The 
author himself mentions Switzerland as an example of loose coupling between the state levels, 
i.e. the cantons and the federal state (2000: 120). In fact, cantonal experts and members of 
cantonal governments taking part in pre-parliamentary expert committees do act without 
imperative mandates. The same holds true for the State Counsellors in the second chamber. In 
addition, the pre-parliamentary and the parliamentary arenas are loosely coupled in the sense that 
the decisions taken in expert committees are (at least formally) not binding for the members of 
Parliament. According to Benz, these characteristics allow a flexibility in decision-making which 
fosters the chances of successful compromise-seeking.  
In some aspects, however, the Swiss case deviates from Benz' model: firstly, in a not only 
federalist but also corporatist political system, the cantonal-federal cleavage is only one of the 
main lines of conflict, which means that negotiations between employers organisations and trade 
unions are essential, too. The inclusion of this additional negotiation forum, however, does not 
seem to counter the very logic of Benz' argument, which can thus still be applied. Secondly, the 
first, pre-parliamentary "round" of negotiation in the Swiss decision-making process is not only a 
phase of agenda setting. On the contrary, at least until the 1990s, expert committees have very 
often produced readily prepared bills supposed to be approved by the Parliament without 
significant further amendments. Therefore, it would be abusive to talk about a real functional 
differentiation between the two arenas in the Swiss case. Rather, we are confronted with a case of 
"institutional redundancy" (Bendor, 1985: 24ss, cf as well Ossipow 1994). In fact, the legislatory 
tasks are much the same in the two arenas and the main lines of conflict represented, too 
(left/right, federal/cantonal). This duplication allows a forum - as the Parliament - to take over an 
issue when compromise solutions failed to be found in a previous round. The redundancy may 
then have a clear creative potential. As Bendor puts it: "One of the most important justifications 
for redundancy is uncertainty – not knowing whether an actor or a component will complete a 
task" (1985: 54). By putting the issue on the agenda of a new cycle of negotiations, cards are 
redistributed in a new game where previous blockades may be overcome16. This applies only, of 
course, if the actors are not the same as in previous arenas. In Switzerland, although there do 
exist rather stable links between major economic interest organisations and political parties 
                                                
16 But compromises reached in the pre-parliamentary phase can also be turn down in Parliament, as in the case of the 
reform of the Labor law in 1996 (see Bonoli 1999a). 
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(Armingeon 1997: 169), this condition is satisfied, because these links are informal and flexible. 
We can thus consider the corporatist and the parliamentary arenas as "loosely coupled". 
  
There is one more factor, however, which lets us not only believe in the possibility of successful 
compromise-oriented negotiations in Parliament - as depicted by Benz – when no compromise 
has been found in the previous phase of the decision-making process, but which even lets us 
expect the occurrence of interparty agreements in such situations. This factor is the threat of the 
optional popular referendum, which forces the political elite to gain a wide support among the 
most important political actors for every voted bill17. 
In sum, for the cases where no corporatist agreement has been reached in the first collective veto 
point, we argue that the combination of loose coupling between the corporatist and the 
consociational arena together with the referendum threat leads to a shift towards interparty 
compromises agreed upon in Parliament as a second collective veto point.  
2.3. Changing interaction between negotiation arenas18 
At first glance, the aforementioned hypothesis seem to be confirmed in the case of the pension 
reform accepted in an optional popular referendum in 1995 as well as in the case of the 
unemployment insurance reform of 1994 for which no referendum was launched. Both policy 
fields experience an encompassing and institutionalised pre-parliamentary phase with standing 
expert committees mainly designed for corporatist negotiation. Nevertheless, no compromise was 
found in this arena. At the end of the parliamentary phase, however, both bills included 
expansionary as well as restrictive elements and were supported by all of the four governmental 
parties. Have the political parties drafted compromises the social partners were unable to reach? 
And if so, which factors were responsible for the failure of corporatist negotiations and for the 
success of interparty cooperation? 
                                                
17 Sciarini and Trechsel (1996: 220) have even shown that a de facto qualified majority of more than 65% of the 
votes in parliamentary is required in order to effectively ban the threat of the optional referendum. 
18 The reconstruction and analysis of the two case studies is based a) on documentary sources as the Governments 
"message, minutes of the meetings of the expert committees and parliamentary committees, parliamentary debates, 
expert reports, publications of political parties and interest associations etc. b) on interviews with main actors of the 
decision-making processes, cf. appendix I.  
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2.3.1. The 10th reform of the old age pension system 1995 
The decision-making process on the 10th reform of the Swiss pension scheme was particularly 
long, since it took 11 years, 7 of them in the pre-parliamentary phase (1983-90) and 4 in 
Parliament (1990-94). The length of the pre-parliamentary phase indicates the difficulties the 
corporatist actors and government had in trying to reach an agreement on the main issues.  
The 10th reform was supposed to introduce gender equality in the pension system. This implied 
two main issues. Firstly, the new system was to be gender-neutral. In fact, in the previous system 
married women generally lost their earned entitlement to a pension, because couples generally 
received a pension corresponding to 150% of the husband's entitlement (Bonoli 2001b: 252). This 
system based on the traditional "male bread-winner-model" was increasingly questioned with the 
adoption of a constitutional article on gender equality in 1981. The system was also unable to 
cope with the rise in divorce rates creating severe financial problems for divorced women who 
had withdrawn from the labour market during a certain time of their marriage in favour of the 
education of children. Left-wing political actors (mainly the Socialist party and trade unions) as 
well as women's organisations demanded a so-called "splitting"-system, in which the 
contributions of both spouses would be added, divided by two and counted separately for each of 
them (Bonoli 2001b: 253). Thus, each person would have an individual pension account, 
independently of his or her marital status. Additionally, they claimed contributions for education 
and caring tasks.  
The second main issue was the age of retirement, fixed at that time at 62 for women and 65 for 
men. Initially for reasons of formal equality and increasingly because of the socio-demographic 
pressure on the finances of the pension system, right-wing political actors (mainly the Liberal 
Democratic Party and the employer’s associations) demanded an equal age of retirement of 65 
years for men and women, whereas the left-wing actors claimed an equal limit of 62 years19.  
 
                                                
19 Both sides were in favour of a certain "flexibility" in the retirement age. According to the employers and right-
wing parties, people should be allowed to retire at 62. However, they would have to support a cut in their pension of 
6,8% per year of pre-retirement in order to assure a "financially neutral flexibility". The trade unions rejected this 
proposal, because it would de facto limit the possibility of early retirement to high income-earners. According to 
them, people should be allowed to retire at 62 without financial losses, keeping however the possibility to stay active 
on the labour market until 65 if they wish so.  
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During the 1980s, the Federal expert committee (commission fédérale de l'AVS) made several 
attempts (1983, 1986, 1988-89) to present a bill likely to gain sufficient political support, but it 
failed to reach an agreement. In the field of pension policy, the pressure for retrenchment was 
already present in the 1980s, because of the publication of reports by the OFAS on the future 
financial problems  of the pension system  due to demographic evolution20. 
Since 1984, a group of women from the socialist party, trade unions and women's organisations 
had been working on possible solutions for a "splitting"-model and started to try to convince their 
organisations of the idea. As an important socialist and trade unionist confirmed in an interview 
(3), this process of conviction was easier a task in the socialist party than in the trade unions, 
mostly because the main beneficiaries of the "splitting" were women who had not been active on 
the labour market. The claim was therefore rather a gender-issue than a traditional left/right-issue. 
However, the Federation of Swiss trade unions together with the socialist party issued in 1987 a 
policy proposal (PSS/USS 1987) including the splitting and the age limit of 62/62. The Liberal 
Democratic Party, in reaction to the left-wing proposal, published in 1988 their preferences (PRD 
1988), taking also position in favour of the "splitting" but claiming retirement for both sexes at 65 
years. A very similar project emanated in the same year from the Federal Committee for women's 
issues (CFQF 1988), a consultative body chaired at that time by a member of the Liberal 
Democratic Party. The Union of Swiss employers associations (UPS), represented in the Federal 
expert committee, announced its preference for the age limit of 65/65 without issuing an official 
statement on the "splitting"-issue. 
In the corporatist negotiations, the defenders of the "splitting"-model, a loose group of women 
with strong links to mainly the socialist party, were unable to reach sufficient support for several 
reasons. Their proposal was rejected several times by a majority of employers, representatives of 
the cantons and federal civil servants21, fearing the increase of pension expenditures and 
administrative costs. Furthermore, the Christian-democratic Federal Counsellor in charge of the 
reform was strongly opposed to the "splitting"-model, because it would have replaced the 
"couple" as the basic unit of the pension system by the "individual". Therefore, the Government 
clearly took position on the issue and abandoned its traditional role as a mediator between the 
                                                
20 In addition, the polarisation between political parties during referendum campaigns already increased during the 
1980s (Papadopoulos 1996). 
21 Unfortunately, we did not have access to the minutes of the meetings of the Federal expert committee. Our 
information on the decision-making in that organ is thus based on interviews with members of the committee.  
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conflicting interests. For the trade unions, in return, although the splitting was one of their official 
claims, the question of the age of retirement was clearly the predominant issue. In fact, this ladder 
issue very directly concerned the unions' members, whereas the "splitting" was designed to 
improve mainly the economic situation of women absent from the labour market. On the second 
issue, the age of retirement, however, employers and trade unions were unable to reach any 
agreement because of completely antagonistic positions (cf above).  
 
In 1990, the government finally handed over a draft of the reform bill to the Parliament which 
was heavily criticised by the corporatist actors as well as the Socialist Party and the Liberal 
Democratic Party. It received a rather hesitant support only from the Christian-democratic Party. 
The bill actually removed any reference to gender in the mere calculation of the pension formula, 
but maintained the concept of a common couple pension and did not include contributions for 
educational and caring tasks. It also maintained the differentiated retirement age of 62 and 65, 
arguing that as long as a material equality in the society was not achieved, a formal inequality in 
the law could be admitted. The government expected the reform to be adopted as a minimal 
solution, satisfying neither side's claims but presenting so little and punctual changes that none of 
the political parties would heavily oppose it or launch a popular referendum against it. 
In Parliament, however, the policy-proposals of the political parties issued in the 1980s became 
very important, because the public pressure for a system independent from the marital status had 
risen and because the advocates of the "splitting" had a better stand in the parties than in the 
corporatist associations. In fact, the parliamentary committee of the lower chamber interrupted its 
work in April 1991, in order to elaborate a financially viable "splitting"-model, compensating the 
losses it caused among the middle-level earners with educational and caring benefits. After about 
one and a half year of debate, the parliamentary committee came to an agreement on a "splitting"-
model, supported by the liberal and the socialist parties and even by parts of the Christian-
democratic party (PDC) and the National-conservative party (UDC). A "social-liberal coalition" 
in parliament was thus able to reach an agreement on this gender issue, which could not be 
obtained in the pre-parliamentary phase. 
However, after this agreement was reached, members of the Liberal Democratic Party (PRD) 
brought the issue of a rise in women's age of retirement back on the agenda, arguing that the costs 
generated by the educational benefits (as a part of the "splitting") should be financially counter-
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balanced. The introduction of the "splitting" had opened a window of opportunity for the PRD as 
well as the right-wing part of the PDC to "legitimately" support the rise in women's age of 
retirement, which was, after short and conflictual debate, set at 64. The introduction of this 
second part of the reform package was clearly more of a strategic manoeuvre than of 
compromise-oriented negotiations. The bill was accepted with minor amendments in the lower 
plenary chamber and in the chamber of the cantons by a right-wing majority. For the PSS, 
however, the package presented a major dilemma, since the party was torn between the support 
for the "splitting" and the opposition against the rise of the age of retirement. In order to avoid a 
popular referendum, the PSS tried to foster a compromise on the issue of the retirement age. An 
attempt which failed, however, because of the intransigent positions of the right-wing majority 
and the trade unions, reluctant to any concession in this field. Therefore, the trade unions 
launched an optional referendum against the pension reform, forcing the socialist party to clearly 
define its priorities, because a referendum unavoidably implied the risk of losing the "splitting". 
After internal debates and a comprehensive consultation of its members, the party considered 
gender equality more important than the increase in retirement age and, hence, gave rather half-
heartedly its support to the new reform22.    
 
In sum, we can identify three factors responsible for the failure of compromise-seeking in the 
pre-parliamentary phase. Firstly, the positions on the age of retirement were simply too divergent 
to make an agreement possible. Welfare state retrenchment defended by the employers was 
confronted with trade unionist claims for a welfare state expansion. Secondly, the corporatist 
actors (unlike the political parties) were unable to address adequately the claims for gender 
equality, which points to Crepaz' (1994) argument that the corporatist actors are increasingly 
losing touch with certain "post-materialist" political issues. Finally, after several years of 
unsuccessful pre-parliamentary negotiations, the government abandoned its traditional position as 
a mediator, taking clearly position against the "splitting" and therefore changing somewhat the 
conditions of negotiation in the corporatist arena.  
                                                
22 At the same time, however, it launched a popular initiative for "the 10th reform of the old age pension system 
without a rise of women's age of retirement" in order to manifest its partial insatisfaction with the package. The 
initiative was rejected by the people and the cantons in 1997. 
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As to the shift of decisive negotiation from the pre-parliamentary to the parliamentary arena, we 
have to note that the "unanimity" of the four major political parties in the popular referendum on 
the pension reform was not the result of a multi-party consensus and it would be abusive to call 
the final reform a compromise, as Obinger does (1998: 232). Rather, it was a package of 
extensive and restrictive measures, strategically tied up under the aegis of the Liberal Democratic 
Party23. While a large consensus could be reached on the expansive part of the reform, the 
retrenchment was in no way consensual.  
2.3.2. Reform of the unemployment insurance scheme 1995 
In order to understand the reasons why the corporatist actors were unable to find an agreement on 
the reform of the unemployment insurance scheme in the pre-parliamentary phase, one has to 
look at the political and economic conditions under which these negotiations took place. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, Switzerland was confronted with a spectacular rise of unemployment 
rates to previously unknown levels (from 1,9% in 1991 to 4,2% in 1992). The insurance system 
was completely unable to deal with the large number of beneficiaries and in particular with the 
new phenomenon of long-term unemployed (more than 1 year). An encompassing reform of the 
unemployment insurance system, as required by the new circumstances would, however, 
certainly take several years until its coming into effect. The Parliament therefore adopted in 1993 
an emergency decree raising the number of daily compensation payments from 300 to 400 days 
but reducing at the same time the replacement rate from 80% to 70% for unemployed without 
dependent children. Furthermore, the definition of "adequate work" was narrowed down, which 
implied that unemployed persons could be required to accept jobs with salaries lower than their 
benefits.  
The decree was mainly drafted by the federal Office in charge (Office fédéral de l'industrie, des 
arts et métiers et du travail OFIAMT), justifying its directory role by the urgent problems of the 
                                                
23 Bonoli (1999b: 215) views this kind of "package deals" as possible substitutes to compromise-seeking. "Cette 
stratégie peut être analysée comme un substitut à la recherche du consensus. Lorsque la nature de la matière ne 
permet pas de dégager un compromis, l'alternative consiste à combiner des éléments divers dans un même texte, ce 
qui augmente les chances d'acceptation en référendum." Although this interpretation may be correct in the sense that 
both strategies, consensus as well as "package deals" enhance the reform's chances of large popular support, it should 
not be overlooked that they are fundamentally different in their "political nature" and cannot be seen as equivalents. 
A generalised tendency towards strategic withdrawal from compromise-seeking would imply a major change in the 
entire policy style of the Swiss political system and challenge the corporatist structure of social policy decision-
making.  
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situation. The trade unions were strictly opposed to the decree during the whole decision-making 
process and launched an optional referendum against it together with the Swiss socialist party 
(PSS). One of their main concerns was that the decree could prejudge the impending ordinary 
reform of the law directing it into a particularly restrictive direction. The employers associations 
had less reasons to oppose the decree, because some of their major demands – the reduction of 
the replacement rate and the redefinition of "adequate work" – had been taken into account by the 
government. However, they also rejected the decree when it came to the popular vote, arguing 
that the restrictive elements of the bill did not go far enough considering the financial situation of 
the unemployment insurance and the rising deficits in the State budget. The employers refusal 
was, however, also tactical in nature, since it allowed them to start the negotiations of the 
following reform process defending a firm, restrictive position. Furthermore, they feared that if 
the left-wing political actors win the referendum on their own, popular support for their position 
would boost the trade unionist negotiation power in the impending corporatist negotiations. 
Although the referendum was finally rejected by a surprisingly large majority of 70% of the 
voters in autumn 1993, it had a significant impact on the decision-making process of the ordinary 
reform.  
In fact, the corporatist negotiations in the Federal experts committee (Commission de 
surveillance du fonds de compensation de l'assurance chômage24) took place between February 
and October 1993, i.e. parallel to the referendum campaign. The fact, that the social partners 
publicly affirmed very clear-cut, antagonist positions on expansion and retrenchment in the 
referendum campaign made innovative compromise-seeking for the new bill difficult. This 
general hardening of the positions was even strengthened by the fact that the draft submitted to 
the committee by the federal administration included mainly the same elements as the emergency 
decree. Thus, the corporatist negotiations were blocked on "hot" issues like an even further 
restrictive redefinition of "adequate work", reductions in the replacement rate as well as the 
exceptions to be admitted and measures in order to prevent so-called abuses of the unemployment 
insurance. Trade unions mainly objected to these restrictive elements, whereas the employers 
associations were strongly opposed to a proposed rise of the contribution rate from 2% to 3% of 
                                                
24 This standing expert committee brings together representatives of the employers associations, the trade unions, the 
cantons as well as private experts, scholars and high civil servants. It is chaired by the director of the federal office in 
charge. 
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the salary. The consultation procedure in summer 1993 reflected the antagonist positions of the 
left- and right-wing political actors. In spite of these negative reactions, the federal office 
maintained most of the controversial elements of the proposal. Putting forward the deadlock in 
the negotiations and the time pressure for the reform, it took over a rather directive role. When 
the government presented the final draft in November 1993, it encountered heavy criticism from 
both sides of the political spectrum. We note then that the negotiation arena lost its leadership 
already in the pre-parliamentary phase, at the profit of the administration, that, however, was also 
unable to present an acceptable compromise.  
 
The Council of States debated the bill first. Its committee criticised the low innovative character 
of the reform and the lack of concertation between the social partners. Nevertheless, it approved 
the reform without major amendments, referring to the absence of viable alternatives and the 
urgent need for a new law.  
In the second chamber's committee, the Union of Swiss Employers Associations and the 
Federation of Swiss Trade Unions once again made clear their strict refusal of the actual draft. 
The defeat in the popular referendum on the emergency decree in autumn 1993 had weakened the 
social partners – most of all the trade unions -, and made them realise that the actual reform had 
come to a complete deadlock that would necessarily end in a further referendum. However, both 
sides nor agreed to the reform as it was proposed neither did they want to get back to the status 
quo ante. In this situation, they were definitely more open for compromise-seeking than during 
the pre-parliamentary phase. 
The parliamentary committee of the lower chamber thus interrupted the debates in July 1994 and, 
in an original move demonstrating parliamentary leadership, brought the corporatist actors back 
to the negotiation table. It became soon clear that a reorientation of the reform towards an active 
labour market policy was an option to which both sides could give their consent. After 
preparatory negotiations among the social partners and the federal administration, a first 
compromise was reached in an extraordinary three-days-session in August 1994 involving the 
parliamentary committee, the social partners and high civil servants. The main new elements of 
the bill were the following: the entitlement period was extended to a maximum of 520 days, 
while, however, only the first 150 daily compensation payments could be obtained 
unconditionally. From that moment on, unemployed persons would be obliged to participate in 
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active labour market programs as vocational training or job creation schemes in order to receive 
further payments. The cantons should create the programs with some financial support from the 
federal level. This general new orientation of the reform was able to satisfy largely both the trade 
unions as well as the employers mainly because of the fact that the active labour market programs 
could be seen either as a right of the beneficiaries to obtain vocational training or as their duty to 
"earn" the compensation payments (workfare). As the leader of the Union of Swiss Employers' 
Associations confirmed in an interview (5), the compulsory character of the active labour market 
programs was very important for having it accepted by the employers because of its "e 
ducational character". The thoroughly new orientation of the law allowed both sides to contribute 
actively to the reform and to accept it without losing credibility, i.e. without making major 
concessions on previously controversial issues.  
  
In the more conservative second chamber, however, the representatives of the cantons made use 
of their veto right by reducing substantially the high number of places in occupational programs 
to be created and financed by the cantons. They even partially went back to the restrictive 
governmental bill, notably as far as the restrictive definition of "adequate work" was concerned. 
These decisions challenged the compromise between the social partners. In a common session of 
both parliamentary committees25, the social partners, members of the cantonal governments and 
high civil servants, a compromise on the scope of the occupational programs and their financing 
was reached. The final reform was accepted by all political parties, the social partners and the 
cantons. Since it included a "substantial element of retrenchment" (Bonoli 1999b: 255) (cf. the 
reduction of replacement rate to 70%, the compulsory nature of the active labour market 
programs and the fact that after 520 days of compensation payments a full year of contribution 
was required to have access to benefits again), one can consider the reform as a very unusual case 
of consensual Welfare state retrenchment. 
 
In conclusion, we find again three factors explaining the failure of pre-parliamentary 
compromise-seeking, partially similar to those identified in the case of old age pension reform. 
                                                
25 Let us note that common negotiations of the parliamentary committees of both chambers run completely counter to 
the principle of bicameralism. The common session changed the competitive veto point of bicameralism into a 
collective veto point of negotiation and shared responsibility. 
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Firstly, the difficult economic situation and the time pressure must be mentioned. In fact, the 
social partners' initial position on how to react to the economic crisis was clearly contradictory. 
While the trade unions claimed an increase in benefits for the unemployed, employers' 
associations concentrated on measures designed to avoid "abuses" of the system and on the 
consolidation of the State budget. Secondly, the media contributed to a hardening of the positions 
of the social partners because of the parallel referendum campaign. Thus, the main issues on 
which no agreement could be found were already heavily debated in public and the corporatist 
actors - for reasons of credibility - could not afford making concessions on them. The ongoing 
referendum campaign also contributed to the limitation of the negotiations to the most conflictual 
issues and inhibited a more innovative approach. Finally, as in the case of old age pension 
reform, the government and with it the federal administration did not act as a mediator in the 
expert committee, but took on a more decisive role. We can relate this finding to similar 
developments in other corporatist European where the government also has played a more active 
role. In fact, Talos and Kittel (1999: 12) note a "clear emancipatory development of government 
from the social partners" and explain it by the need for cuts in the social security system on 
which the social partners would not have been able to reach a consensus by themselves. 
Similarly, Anderson (2001) has observed in the Netherlands a shift of power from the social 
partners to the government in social insurance politics. This finding is confirmed by Compston 
(1999:4) who even asserts that social policy-concertation in the Netherlands between 1990 and 
1997 has "hardly existed". This empowerment of the government was the result of a separation of 
the spheres of government and industrial relations: "the government intervened less in industrial 
relations, while the social partners were less involved in policy-making". Finally, major policy 
reforms in Denmark (as the reform of active labour market policy in 1993 or the reform of the 
early retirement pay scheme in 1998) have been made unilaterally by the government as part of 
the annual negotiations on the state-budget (Blom-Hansen 1999: 10). In all these countries, the 
government has played an unusually active role in the stage of policy formulation and the room 
for corporatist agreement was therefore restricted.  
 
As to the hypothesis on the replacement of corporatist agreements by interparty compromises, it 
can partially be confirmed. In fact, compromise-seeking was, as expected, shifted to the second 
collective veto point, where – under the threat of a complete failure of the reform – an agreement 
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was reached. However, we note that the arrangement of the decision-making process has proven 
more flexible than expected. Political parties represented by the members of the parliamentary 
committees, not only gave to compromise-seeking a second chance in their own negotiation 
forum, but they also associated under their aegis the actors of the corporatist forum and even the 
cantons to the negotiations26. In that sense, although political parties certainly played an active 
role defending their positions on the future orientation of the reform, they also took over to some 
extent the governments' traditional role of a mediator between the corporatist actors. 
Conclusion 
We have hypothesised that in the field of social policy, negotiations between the social partners 
in the pre-parliamentary, corporatist arena became increasingly difficult in the 1990s compared to 
the 1970s, due to pressure for Welfare State retrenchment, ideological polarisation, declining 
legitimacy and homogeneity of the interest organisations and increasing media coverage. 
Moreover, with reference to the inherent creative potential of loosely coupled negotiation arenas 
(Benz 2000) and of institutional redundancy (Bendor 1985), combined with the threat of a failure 
of policy reform in a popular referendum, we argued about the substitution of corporatist 
consensus by interparty agreements reached in Parliament.  
In the cases of old age pension reform and unemployment insurance reform in the 1990s, the 
increasing difficulty of compromise-seeking in the corporatist forum as well as the shift of the 
decisive locus of decision-making from the pre-parliamentary to the parliamentary arena have 
been confirmed. Two main common factors seem to explain the failure of negotiations between 
the trade unions and the employers associations in both cases. Firstly, the pressure for Welfare 
State retrenchment exerted by the economic recession, budget deficits and socio-demographic 
factors has created too large a distance between the major objectives of the social partners. 
Secondly, because of the failed negotiations in the pre-parliamentary phase, the Government and 
with it the federal administration played an unusually active role, as a policy entrepreneur, and 
thus abandoned its traditional role of a mediator between the corporatist actors. In return, it is 
important to note that ideological polarisation has not significantly challenged corporatist 
relations in the field of social policy, in the sense that the willingness to negotiate continuously 
                                                
26 This compromise oriented renegotiation in Parliament distinguishes the cases of the unemployment insurance 
reform from the AVS reform, where the final solution was rather the result of strategic coalition building under the 
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persisted on both sides. A certain hardening of the positions could, however, be observed in the 
case of unemployment reform, mainly because of the parallel referendum campaign and, hence, 
the increasing exposure of the corporatist actors to the media. While the legitimacy and the 
internal coherence of the interest organisations seems to have remained intact, they have proven, 
to a certain extent, unable to respond adequately to the rather new, "post-materialist" claim 
(Crepaz 1994) of gender equality in the field of pension policy. This incapacity has considerably 
strengthened the role of the political parties in that case. Further research on corporatist 
compromise-seeking in the social policy area would be needed to test whether these results can 
be generalised. 
As to the shift of the main locus of decision-making from the pre-parliamentary to the 
parliamentary arena, the two case studies reveal a more complex picture than expected. 
Corporatist compromises, which have prevailed as decisive agreements in the 1970s, are not 
"simply" replaced by interparty agreements fostered in Parliament. First of all, as shown in the 
case of pension reform, the final solution, although supported by all decisive political parties, is 
not a consensual agreement, but consists in a strategically tied up package of extensive and 
restrictive elements. Secondly, when a final compromise is reached, as in the case of 
unemployment insurance reform, its elaboration needed to include further actors than the mere 
political parties. In fact, the innovative compromise reached was to a large extent jointly 
elaborated by the main actors of all three Swiss negotiation arenas, namely the corporatist actors, 
the political parties and the cantonal governments, such a process revealing an astonishing 
"institutional flexibility" of Swiss decision-making. 
According to our findings, the increasing importance of the parliamentary phase as a locus of 
substantive decision-making in the field of social policy seems – at least partially – to be the 
consequence of the failure of compromise-seeking in the pre-parliamentary arena. In a similar 
vein, Jegher (1999: 51ss) showed that between 1995 and 1997, all bills on which no compromise 
was found in the pre-parliamentary phase have been significantly modified in Parliament27. For 
the same period, she found that the Parliament modified 69,2% of the social policy bills, while 
                                                                                                                                                        
aegis of the Liberal democratic party. 
27 For 8 out of 49 analysed cases, no compromise has been found in the pre-parliamentary phase. All of them were 
significantly modified in Parliament, whereas only 58% of the cases for which a previous compromise had been 
reached were modified, most of them only slightly (Jegher 1999: 54).  
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this was true only for 35% of all bills (1999: 169)28. We would nevertheless like to conclude by 
maintaining that the overall importance of the parliamentary compared to the pre-parliamentary 
arena is difficult to evaluate and that such an assessment is only of a limited interest. The 
interactions between the two arenas as well as their relative importance depend much on the 
configuration of each policy subsystem (with its main specialised actors) and on the institutional 
and contextual conditions under which negotiations take place. Decision-making in important 
social policy issues clearly followed different patterns in the 1970s and in the 1990s, but it 
remains to be tested to what extend this finding can be generalised beyond the field of social 
policy29. 
 
                                                
28 More generally, Lüthi (1996) confirmed the rising importance of the Parliament and in particular of its committees 
in the 1990s. However, unlike us, she attributes this phenomenon to an institutional reform, i.e. the replacement in 
1992 of ad hoc committees by permanent and specialised committees. This explanatory variable can, however, be 
excluded in our case, the committees in charge of the pension reform as well as the unemployment insurance reform 
having been created on the previous, ad hoc basis. Lüthi does not test alternative, non institutional explanatory 
variables for the increasing "activity" of the parliamentary committees, because of the relatively short period of 
analysis chosen (1990-94). In fact, for this period, she considers other variables as the economic context or the 
polarisation among political actors as held constant (1996: 87).  
29 In our research, we observe for example a more pronounced administrative leadership and a tendency to 
circumvent the corporatist forum, combined with a relatively passive parliament, in strongly internationalised policy 
areas, a pattern quite different from the pattern portrayed in social policy reforms. 
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Appendix : Elite interviews on social partnership in social policy making in the 1990s, on 
the pension reform of 1995 and the unemployment insurance reform of 1995.  
 
1) Leader of the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions (USS) since summer 1994. Associated as its 
representative to the unemployment insurance reform of 1995. 
2) Leader of the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions (USS) from winter 1993 until summer 1994. 
Associated as its representative to the unemployment insurance reform of 1995. 
3) Leader of the Trade Union of Industry, Construction and Services (FTMH) from 1992 until 
2000. Associated as its representative and as a member of the parliamentary committees 
(PSS) in charge to the pension reform of 1995 and the unemployment insurance reform of 
1995.  
4) Leader of the Union of Swiss employers' associations (UPS) from 1970 until summer 1993. 
Associated as its representative and as a member of Parliament (PRD) to the pension reform 
of 1995 (chair of the parliamentary committee in charge) and the unemployment insurance 
reform of 1995.  
5) Leader of the Union of Swiss employers' associations (UPS) since summer 1993. Associated 
as its representative to the unemployment insurance reform of 1995. 
6) Vice-director of the Federal Office of Social Insurance (OFAS). Associated to the pension 
reform of 1995. 
7) Director of the Federal Office of Industry, Crafts and Labour (OFIAMT) since 1991 (the 
office has been renamed and is called today 'Directorate of Labour'). Associated to the 
unemployment insurance reform of 1995 (chair of the expert committee). 
8) Chair of the parliamentary committee (PDC) of the National Council responsible for the 
unemployment insurance reform of 1995. 
9) Member of the parliamentary committee (PDC) of the Council of States responsible for the 
pension reform of 1995  
10) Member of the parliamentary committee (PSS) of the National Council responsible for the 
pension reform of 1995  
11) Member of the parliamentary committee (PRD) of the National Council responsible for the 
pension reform of 1995, chair of the CFQF in 1987/8, associated as its representative to the 
pre-parliamentary expert committee.  
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